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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/04/2006

Accident number: 95

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 31/05/1997

Where it occurred: Ibrahim Khail Village,
Gardiz City, Paktia
Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none

Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: agricultural
(abandoned)
ditch/channel/trench
hard

Date record created: 24/01/2004

Date last modified: 24/01/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate metal-detector (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
request for clearance with explosive charge (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
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Accident report
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly
"controlled" his partner.
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly
available. The following summarises its content.
The victim had been a deminer for three years. He had last attended a revision course two
months before and had last been on leave 41 days before the accident. The ground in the
area was described as agricultural land – medium hard – a connection ditch near an
abandoned military post. A photograph showed that the "ditch" had shallow sloping sides and
the accident occurred at the bottom of it – where the mine may have been deeply buried. The
sides of the detonation crater were steep and deep.
The investigators determined that the victim did not centralise the reading point from his
detector and "did not follow the marking procedures properly". He prodded while in a
squatting position. They noted that the device was identified as a PMN (from "found
fragments") and that the victim's helmet and bayonet were "destroyed".
The Team Leader said that the victim believed the reading was from a fragment and so did
not mark the reading properly so the accident was his mistake. He suggested readings be
investigated with an explosive charge in future.
The Section Leader said that the victim was working properly up to the accident, but then
made a mistake and hit the mine. He said such accidents could be prevented if deminers
worked according to the rules and obeyed their superiors.
The victim's partner said that he was working properly but the mine was too deep to allow
him to centralise the reading. He said that in similar areas readings should be investigated by
detonating explosives.

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that the accident occurred because the victim did not follow the
rules. He failed to mark the position of the detector reading properly and so prodded directly
onto the mine.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that no deminer should be allowed to prod in the squatting
position when the ground was suitable for prodding prone; that the team Command Group
should stress to deminers the need to follow mine marking procedures properly; and that the
Section leader should be disciplined for his poor command and control.

Victim Report
Victim number: 127

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: no

Compensation: 500,000 Rs (100%)

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Helmet

Protection used: elmet, Thin, short visor

Thin, short visor
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Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Hand
minor Legs
minor Neck
minor Shoulder
severe Hand
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
The victim's injuries were summarised as deep lacerations on his right hand, both legs, chin
and right shoulder.

A medic's sketch (reproduced above) showed abrasions to his neck, right shoulder, lower
right leg, lower and upper left leg and left hand, also abrasions, burns and lacerations to his
left hand.
A photograph showed deep lacerations between the thumb and forefinger of his right hand,
some burn discoloration on thumb and forefinger, and a bandaged forearm and shoulder.
The demining group submitted a claim on 22nd September 1997 but did not list the injuries.
Compensation of 500,000 Rs (100%) was forwarded on 4th December 1997.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the victim
appears to have been breaking SOPs by not marking his detector reading appropriately and
his error went uncorrected. However it is possible that he was working as directed, so the
secondary cause is listed as “Unavoidable”.
From the injuries listed, it is assumed that he was wearing his visor and that his eyes were not
injured. However, the compensation for 100% disability conflicts with the injuries listed,
implying that some may not have been recorded.
The use of a squatting position to "excavate" was in breach of UN requirements, but not in
breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those requirements. The failure of
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the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt the SOP for local conditions, or
enforce their own standards may be seen as a management failing.
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.
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